Almost three years have passed since Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin characterized their relationship as one with “no limits,” a declaration that came just weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Since then, such grandiose proclamations have cooled down considerably. The “no limits” terminology was swiftly abandoned, likely due to Beijing’s influence. During Putin’s visit last May, he referred to their relationship as being as close as that of brothers. Xi Jinping, however, referred to Putin in a considerably more reserved manner, describing him as merely “a good friend and a good neighbor.” Interestingly, China has been notably hesitant to adopt Putin’s characterization of their country as an ally.
Despite this, the alliance has continued to expand and intensify along economic, political, and military lines, much to the concern of Western nations. The US Council on Foreign Relations recently labeled this partnership the most significant threat to American national interests in six decades. The past year has witnessed unprecedented military cooperation between Chinese and Russian forces, though this appears more as a demonstration of joint strength rather than a step toward the kind of interoperability that underpins US-European alliances. In September, the US hinted for the first time that China might be providing direct support to Russia’s military operations in Ukraine, moving beyond merely supplying dual-use equipment and serving as a crucial market for Russian oil exports. A series of books discussing this “new cold war” emerged in 2024.
The current standoff between Western nations and a Sino-Russian coalition—with Moscow now as the junior partner and including Iran and North Korea—echoes past tensions. Concerns about nuclear conflict have resurfaced, and Taiwan, much like Cuba once was, could become a hotspot of conflict. President Joe Biden has framed this as a global contest between a united front of democracies and authoritarian regimes. Yet, this framing is complicated by the US’s relationship with Saudi Arabia and India’s neutral stance on the Ukraine conflict, further highlighted by accusations against India of political assassinations in Canada.
There’s ample evidence that there are, indeed, limits to the Sino-Russian partnership, as seen through the lens of the Ukraine conflict. Despite recent US commentary on lethal aid, China has demonstrated a hesitancy to supply arms and ammunition. Russian businesses are reportedly encountering increasing obstacles as Chinese banks tighten their compliance with sanctions due to threats from Western nations, even while priority payments appear to be proceeding without interruption. Analyzing the two nations’ recent security statements reveals that they are as much about managing expectations and restraining each other’s ambitions as they are about projecting mutual power. Similarly, while China’s support for Russia’s endeavors in Ukraine is evident yet restricted, Russia has also been clear about its reluctance to engage in conflict on China’s behalf.
Donald Trump’s re-election has stirred the possibility of a “reverse Nixon,” with the US potentially embracing Moscow while sidelining Beijing, given his aggressive stance on China and apparent admiration for Putin. However, it’s important to remember that Nixon’s rapprochement with China was feasible due to the bitter Sino-Soviet split that followed their initial alliance. Both nations have learned from that historical rift and will likely take a long-term view, beyond any single presidential tenure. It seems more plausible that Russia would accept incentives from Washington where possible while continuing to align with Beijing as they choose, albeit potentially in a more subdued manner.
The two countries employ vastly different strategies. While Putin’s Russia is more geared toward disruption, Xi views the current global order as something that can be shaped to China’s advantage. Historian Dr. Sergey Radchenko, an expert in Sino-Soviet relations, suggests that theirs is an alignment rather than a formal alliance, driven by shared interests and grievances rather than ideology. This very limitation fosters a more pragmatic and adaptable—and therefore more enduring—relationship.
Trump’s return underscores the fragility of the US-European alliance, presenting a significant challenge for NATO’s new secretary general, Mark Rutte, as he works to fortify it. Internal challenges and contradictions within Western democracies embolden Russia and China, yet these two powers face their own hurdles. After years of spectacular economic growth, which nearly saw it surpass the US, China’s economy is showing signs of struggle. Some experts believe that an economic downturn might be the most likely trigger for China to make a move on Taiwan, with nationalist fervor taking the lead. China’s diplomatic engagements are also stirring questions globally about the true costs of doing business with them. Meanwhile, the conflict in Ukraine has revealed cracks in Russia’s military and economic armor. The weakening of Iran’s “axis of resistance” and the downfall of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad have exposed further vulnerabilities.
Some analysts compare today to the 1930s, a time when the global order was collapsing, rather than the stable post-World War II decades. Over the past five years, incidents of violence in warfare have doubled, prompting some experts to warn that we might be entering a “new normal” of military conflict. This fall, UN Secretary-General António Guterres cautioned about a “purgatory of polarity,” which has allowed nations to act without accountability. During the cold war, regions in the global south paid a steep price through devastating conflicts. Historian Odd Arne Westad describes the cold war as “relentlessly bipolar” when tensions peaked. However, today we find ourselves in a multipolar world, where powers like India, South Africa, Turkey, and Indonesia are forging their own independent paths with increased resolve.
Our world is also more economically intertwined than ever. The financial isolation imposed on Russia has exceeded what was once thought possible. Efforts by Western politicians to lessen reliance on China—whether termed decoupling or de-risking—are noteworthy, as China’s share of the global economy has declined from its heights in 2021. Proposed tariffs by Trump would further impact China, as Sino-US trade already saw a sharp decline in 2023. Yet, that trade is still more than double the volume of China’s trade with Russia.
Economic links, shared challenges, and the undeniable necessity for collaboration on pressing issues—most notably the existential threat of climate change—don’t automatically translate into cooperation. The pandemic highlighted how urgent it is for nations to work together on global health, but also how frequently they prioritized national interests instead. The chasms between the world’s countries may widen even further by 2025. However, an escalating spiral of tension should not be viewed as either unavoidable or desirable.
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