President-elect Donald Trump has outlined an ambitious agenda for his upcoming term, and it would be an understatement to say he’s got big plans. He’s promised to carry out the largest deportation operation ever seen in America, secure the border with Mexico, and broker peace between Ukraine and Russia.
However, for Trump, these tasks might take a backseat to one particularly pressing issue — tackling North Korea’s nuclear program. This has been a challenge that none of his predecessors have successfully managed to overcome. As reported by insiders to Reuters in late November, Trump was already considering reigniting the direct diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, a venture he initially pursued during his first term.
But talk is cheap, and translating these discussions into reality is quite a different story. If Trump assumes rekindling his rapport with Kim will be straightforward, he might be setting himself up for a letdown. The North Korean nuclear dilemma was tough five years ago, and it’s likely even more complicated now.
During Trump’s initial term, he championed direct engagement with the North Korean leader, pushing past the skepticism from his national security team. This strategy made sense at the time, particularly because previous administrations under Bush and Obama, which adopted a more procedural approach, had managed neither success nor efficiency in dealing with Pyongyang.
After almost a year filled with fiery rhetoric and musings about a “bloody nose” strategy designed to coerce Pyongyang into negotiations, Trump opted to wager on face-to-face diplomacy. His alternatives – either imposing additional economic sanctions or considering military action – seemed either fruitless or catastrophic. Plus, South Korean President Moon Jae-in at the time persuaded Trump that opening a direct line of communication with Kim could be pivotal for reaching a landmark nuclear agreement.
Despite this, the face-to-face diplomacy endured through three summits with Kim, but ultimately, it fizzled without any long-lasting success. Trump did secure a temporary halt in North Korean missile testing for a year — an achievement considering past activities — but the flashy summits didn’t yield a sustained resolution. The disconnect stemmed from Trump’s insistence on total denuclearization, heavily influenced by his hawkish advisors, clashing with Kim’s willingness to merely scale down activities at Yongbyon, the main plutonium research facility.
Diplomacy between the U.S. and North Korea has been stalled since then. The Biden administration’s attempts to reach out to Pyongyang over the past four years have been rebuffed, probably because North Korea views Washington’s efforts as lacking seriousness and disapproves of U.S. attempts to reinforce military ties with South Korea and Japan.
Looking ahead to January 20, tackling the North Korean nuclear issue remains just as complex, if not more so. Kim is less eager for a nuclear deal and an end to U.S. sanctions now than he was during Trump’s first term.
Kim hasn’t forgotten the previous engagements with Trump, viewing the 2018 and 2019 summits as at best unproductive and at worst personally embarrassing. It’s not surprising given that Kim invested significantly in trying to broker deals to lift U.S. sanctions and normalize relations between Pyongyang and Washington. But those attempts failed. Despite three summits, U.S. sanctions stayed in place, and relations remained adversarial.
Kim is likely to tread carefully this time. He stated in November that they had already explored every possible negotiation avenue with the U.S., concluding that the result was simply more American hostility. In a December speech, he pledged to respond with the “toughest … counteractions” against the U.S., reinforcing his stance against what he perceives as a hostile coalition led by Washington.
The global political climate has also shifted considerably. Back in 2018 and 2019, North Korea was relatively isolated, and the lifting of U.S. sanctions was crucial for its economic progress.
Now, however, the conflict in Ukraine has presented Kim’s regime with a chance to diversify its alliances beyond China by tightening connections with Russia, including deploying thousands of North Korean troops to contribute to Russia’s efforts in Ukraine. Russia, which once aligned with the U.S. in its aim to denuclearize North Korea, is now using Pyongyang as a strategic card to thwart U.S. ambitions in East Asia.
The advantages for Kim in this burgeoning relationship with Russia are apparent: Putin needs arms and personnel; Kim requires money and military technology. With Russia wielding its veto power at the UN Security Council, the prospect of new sanctions is bleak, and existing ones are weakly enforced. As long as the bond between Russia and North Korea remains strong, bringing North Korea back to the bargaining table will be a steep uphill battle for Trump.
That said, this doesn’t mean Trump shouldn’t give diplomatic engagement with North Korea another shot. Despite the criticism he faced, Trump’s bold approach of engaging directly with Kim was a commendable effort to gain traction on an issue that has confounded U.S. leaders for over thirty years.
However, if Trump is to make another attempt, he must do so with a strong sense of realism. Given North Korea’s continued advancements in nuclear and missile technologies, any deal reached will likely be less favorable than what could have been achieved in 2019—if a deal can be struck at all.
Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a foreign affairs commentator for the Spectator.
