Off the coast of California, the U.S. Air Force is currently engaged in the test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile. This test is purely experimental, as the missile carries no nuclear warhead. In just half an hour, the missile will hit its designated target over 4,000 miles away in the ocean. Come January 20, Donald Trump will once again have authority over these formidable weapons, a responsibility he reacquires amidst a particularly unstable period of global history.
In the United States, the president holds the exclusive authority to use nuclear weapons, making this a unique area where Mr. Trump’s discretion will be unchecked. There’s no requirement for him to consult Congress, the judiciary, or even senior advisors on their deployment. With this power, he has the liberty to shape the country’s nuclear strategy, policies, and diplomatic engagements.
During his campaign, Mr. Trump addressed the potential threats posed by the expanding nuclear arsenals around the world. His upcoming return to the Oval Office presents him with a chance to navigate these threats and potentially reduce them. For this to happen, his administration must work agilely and strategically, always mindful of the catastrophic nature of nuclear armaments.
China, Russia, and the United States are embroiled in a new contest for dominance on various fronts, including military and economics. Yet, not every element of this rivalry is zero-sum, particularly concerning nuclear arms. There are numerous opportunities for these nations to bolster their security by averting expensive arms races and perilous confrontations.
For many Americans, the complexities of preparing for nuclear conflict are unfamiliar territory. This past summer, Times Opinion had rare, close-up access to observe these preparations up close, offering insights into the mechanics of a war apparatus that ideally remains dormant.
The U.S. Air Force carries out this complex missile testing about three times annually. Service members retrieve a missile from an underground silo in the Great Plains, remove its nuclear payload, and transport it to Vandenberg Space Force Base. Such tests are commonplace among other nuclear-capable countries as well.
As we approach 2024, the global nuclear equilibrium feels more precarious than it has been in several decades. “Tomorrow, a war could break out so destructive that recovery would be impossible,” Mr. Trump stated in June. “No one could recover from it, not even the whole world.” With the major New START nuclear arms reduction treaty between the U.S. and Russia set to expire in 14 months and Russian leaders dismissing talks of a new framework with the Biden administration, we face the brink of a world free of limits on nuclear armament deployments.
Russia’s Vladimir Putin has periodically raised the notion of escalating his conflict with Ukraine to involve nuclear deployment. Meanwhile, India and Pakistan each possess roughly 170 nuclear warheads and are expanding their stockpiles. U.S. intelligence suggests China plans to double its current arsenal of 500 warheads by 2030, pursuing the most extensive expansion and diversification campaign in its history. In North Korea, missile development enters a phase aimed squarely at delivering a strike to American shores. Meanwhile, the unrest in Gaza threatens to balloon into a broader regional conflict; Israel already possesses nuclear weapons, while Iran steps closer to crafting its own, risking a nuclear chain reaction throughout the Middle East.
The potential for nuclear escalation isn’t exclusive to America’s adversaries. Allies initially disinclined to pursue nuclear capabilities are beginning to debate the necessity of such assets. A recent poll in South Korea, following the impeachment of President Yoon Suk-yeol, suggested that 70% of citizens favor developing a nuclear weapon, assuming others like Japan would follow. Germany continues to weigh the possibility of creating its own nuclear program, complemented by Poland’s desire for a more significant role in NATO’s nuclear initiatives. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has hinted at his country’s need for nuclear arms should NATO membership not materialize.
For Mr. Trump, serious focus on this issue could serve as a testament to his promise of restoring American greatness. Throughout the latter half of the 20th century and beyond, the U.S. maintained a clear objective—to safeguard the world from the perils of nuclear weapons. This aim wasn’t automatic in the aftermath of the 1945 bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; during the early Cold War, U.S. and Soviet arsenals swelled to humanity-ending proportions. By the early 1960s, these superpowers seemed headed for a collision course that would lead to nuclear annihilation, a threat underscored by the devastating potential of these destructive tools.
The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis shifted both the U.S. and Soviet Union onto a new trajectory. By 1963, they had signed the first treaty dealing with nuclear testing. Just five years later, under the auspices of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, many nations committed to a grand compromise: if non-nuclear states refrained from developing weaponry, nuclear-capable ones would work towards disarmament. Responding to increased public scrutiny, American leaders increasingly championed establishing limits on nuclear warhead numbers, transparency, and communication. Efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals became bipartisan staples lasting generations.
Yet today, most of that collaborative groundwork has unraveled. It’s undeniable that Mr. Trump’s first administration played a part in exacerbating some of the risks we now face. Still, this changed landscape compels the U.S. to lead once more—an endeavor Mr. Trump has signaled, judging by his campaign rhetoric.
Previously, Mr. Trump recalled his realization of nuclear weapon dangers after discussions with an unexpected source: his uncle, an MIT professor. In 1986, before venturing into politics, Mr. Trump reached out to the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, laureates of the Nobel Peace Prize, to explore lowering the nuclear threat with the Soviets.
Now, as President, Mr. Trump will bear the responsibility of navigating away from nuclear disaster. It’s crucial to discuss what priorities he and the nation should set.
In Hiroshima in 2016, then-President Barack Obama encouraged nuclear states to display the “courage to escape the logic of fear and pursue a world without nuclear weapons.”
The concept of nuclear abolition has never been a reality—the U.S. cannot yet afford to entertain it amidst China’s rapid nuclear expansion, marking the first time three nuclear superpowers coexist. The stability of the Cold War’s bipolar balance is in question; hence, American diplomats have no option but to renew arms control dialogues, ensuring future generations can progress towards nuclear disarmament.
American missile tests deliver invaluable insights into personnel performance and the functionality of aging weaponry systems in genuine scenarios. Day in and out, Air Force officers conduct 24-hour shifts in bunkers, awaiting presidential launch orders. The tests also unmistakably signal readiness to adversaries: should the command come, the U.S. nuclear arsenal is primed.
Mr. Trump’s initial administration shunned the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and unilaterally exited agreements like the Iran nuclear deal, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the Open Skies Treaty. However, Mr. Trump did exhibit a willingness to dialogue with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, albeit fruitlessly.
There’s a chance now to address these past shortcomings. Iran’s new leader, Masoud Pezeshkian, has indicated openness to rekindle nuclear negotiations with the West.
Mr. Trump’s campaign emphasized his withdrawal from earlier deals, yet in September, he entertained potential fresh talks. As Politico reported, Mr. Trump remarked, “We have to make a deal because the consequences are impossible.”
Mr. Trump comprehends these dangers and might utilize his rapport with President Putin to seek resolutions. Encouragingly, some of his campaign discourse suggests optimism. He remarked in 2023 that Mr. Putin, once reticent about nuclear power, now publicly proclaims it. Acknowledging the destructiveness of nuclear discourse, Mr. Trump added, “You don’t talk about it.” Yet, he noted, “Now they’re talking about it all the time.”
Mr. Trump could propose the U.S. adopt a no-first-use policy, an openness that could allure China to negotiations. China recently underscored the significance of such policies to advance meaningful nuclear discussions.
Adopting a comprehensive no-first-use stance may ease pressures and lay the groundwork for more ambitious talks.
Though the military frequently tests ICBMs, it hasn’t conducted an underground nuclear detonation in over three decades. This moratorium, observed by China and Russia, could soon dissipate as all three nations modify and expand test sites. Commercial satellite imagery from Planet Labs PBC analyzed by the James Martin Center indicates construction activities—new buildings, roads, and tunnels—possibly foreshadow live weapon testing.
Even without wartime deployment, the impacts of nuclear weapons linger long-term. More than 2,000 nuclear tests in the 20th century have left enduring fallout. This drove the 1990s’ voluntary test suspension by nuclear powers, excluding North Korea. Mr. Trump’s subsequent administration should work to uphold this moratorium.
A conservative manifesto, Project 2025 from the Heritage Foundation, suggests revitalizing testing infrastructure, unlike the tests at Vandenberg. This plan involves actual nuclear detonations. Last summer, Robert O’Brien, Mr. Trump’s former national security advisor, advocated resuming tests for safety and reliability. If the U.S. proceeds, rivals like Russia and China would likely do the same.
Mr. Trump’s distancing from O’Brien’s remarks and Project 2025 is noteworthy. Resuming tests erodes the scientific headward the U.S. currently enjoys, built from over 1,000 known detonations, unmatched computing power, and continued arsenal improvements.
The U.S., Russia, and China are engaged in a whirlwind weapon modernization endeavor, equating to multibillion-dollar expenditures named “modernizing.” The Pentagon plans to overhaul its nuclear resources over the next three decades, encompassing missiles, jets, submarines, and warheads, at an estimated cost near $2 trillion.
Mr. Trump could scale back this monumental effort. Does the U.S. require a simultaneous update of all arsenals? Significant savings could be realized by purchasing fewer weapons. Political room to reassess investments could be attained by forming a commission to evaluate modernization projects, which are currently over-budget and delayed.
Project 2025 rebuffs Congressional cost-saving alternatives, promoting nuclear escalation akin to Reagan’s Cold War peak. Although Mr. Trump distanced himself from this stance, Christopher Miller, lead author of Project 2025’s defense chapter, fueled proposals prioritizing nuclear arms and reintroducing nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missiles. Other suggestions include developing an untested “cruise missile defense of the homeland,” necessitating increased budgets.
Mr. Trump has criticized hawkish figures within his ranks. This is an occasion to demonstrate character-defining choices in nuclear policy—tackling Republican orthodoxy and paving his distinct policy path.
Mr. Trump will soon wield authority over roughly 3,700 nuclear weapons. Any reactions to nuclear missile threats against the U.S. would necessitate instantaneous decisions, sometimes with as few as 15 minutes.
Democrats, including Senator Edward Markey and Representative Ted Lieu, proposed a bill preventing first-strike nuclear actions without Congress’ consent, expressing concerns about rash decisions. Although unlikely to pass this Congress, the bill doesn’t impede Mr. Trump’s capacity to counter nuclear aggression, a crucial presidential capability.
Endorsing Congressional approval for pre-emptive strikes signals U.S. commitment toward nuclear de-escalation—a stance denouncing impulsive threats like those from Mr. Putin. Acknowledging Congress’ voice wouldn’t handicap Mr. Trump; it would amplify international trust in American restraint.
The paradox of the nuclear era is that the most hawkish leaders, historically, orchestrated significant arms control achievements and reduction initiatives. Eisenhower turned his wartime leadership into a caution against militaristic influences. Khrushchev and Kennedy subtly moderated their stances following the crisis of potential extinction. Reagan and Gorbachev, both previously unapologetic in rhetoric, eventually saw the necessity to temper nuclear threat levels.
On a campaign of peace fortified by strength, Mr. Trump now has an opportunity to follow through on such promises. Successfully, he may very well leave the world less burdened by nuclear anxieties than when he re-ascends to power. If he achieves this, it’s a result every American should hope for.
