Yesterday, Kemi Badenoch addressed the Conservative government’s approach to immigration, admitting they “got it wrong” and promised to implement a “strict numerical cap.”
This isn’t the first time we’ve seen such promises. Back in the summer of 2010, as the chief economist at the Cabinet Office, I warned David Cameron against his commitment to cut migration to the “tens of thousands.” My analysis indicated this target would force him to choose between harming the UK economy and workforce or failing to meet a key political promise. I diplomatically suggested adjustments to this target.
A note from Cameron’s private office relayed that Damian Green, the newly appointed immigration minister, reassured him otherwise, referencing figures from Migration Watch UK. However, their calculations were riddled with fundamental errors and economic misconceptions. In a recent BBC documentary, Cameron commented, “Jonathan Portes is a clever man – but he didn’t support the government’s plans, so I wasn’t inclined to heed his advice.”
This decision, as it transpired, was his misstep. Although my objectives didn’t align with his, my duty as a civil servant was to advise on potentially better and less hazardous routes to achieve his goals. The ensuing situation proved my point: facing poor options between damaging limitations on skilled and student migration from outside the EU, Cameron initially opted for these measures, but ultimately missed his targets. Things worsened in 2014 when UK labor markets opened to Romania and Bulgaria, exposing how EU membership conflicted with numerical migration targets, setting the stage for Vote Leave’s success.
Fast-forward 14 years from Cameron’s promise, eight years post-Brexit vote, and nearly four years since ending free movement and initiating the post-Brexit system, we see a clearer picture of these failures through recent immigration figures from the Office for National Statistics. By June 2024, data indicated that the swift and unexpected rise in migration post-pandemic has diminished. Visa issuance in the latest quarter dropped by a third from the previous year, notably with health and care visas declining by over eighty percent.
Looking ahead, what can current leadership glean from past mistakes? Clearly, setting rigid immigration number targets or evaluating success based on fluctuations sets one up for disappointment. Numerous economic and geopolitical factors lie beyond government control. Banking on enhanced training and skills to lower migration demand is also dicey. DYNAMICALLY EVOLVING sectors may still require both skilled local workers and immigrants. In fields like care, increased funding and higher wages are crucial, albeit challenging.
The second lesson is grounding policy in long-term economic consequences along with immediate political implications. Restrictions may not derail Labour’s growth plans but aren’t helpful either, as migration has driven all labor-force growth over the last five years. The UK’s thriving industries, such as professional and business services, depend heavily on migration for innovation and productivity. Nor will declining migration improve public services, since immigrants not only fill critical roles but also contribute more financially than they withdraw from the state.
Third, we cannot overlook the impacts of abrupt policy shifts and unintended outcomes. After halting free movement, a primary worker pool for care was severed, only to be countered by liberalizing care visas. Then, panic over numbers led to targeting dependents, a notably vulnerable group. For student visas, Cameron and later Theresa May scrapped the “post-study work” option, only for Boris Johnson to reinstate and promote it with vigor. Yet, subsequent new restrictions have now destabilized university funding.
The fourth takeaway is the necessity of proper evaluation. Recently, the anti-immigration rhetoric has spiraled, with unfounded claims like the Centre for Policy Studies’ suggestion of merely 5% of new migrants in high-wage roles. In reality, initial data points reveal that recent non-EU migrants in 2022 and 2023 earn comparably or better than those pre-pandemic. Though data remains patchy and preliminary, investing in comprehensive analysis post-turbulence is wise before embarking on another round of policy alterations.
Lastly, the government must craft a convincing narrative that assures the public of controlled, beneficial migration. While challenging, it’s not insurmountable. In light of the past 14 years’ missteps, embracing transparency—making realistic, achievable commitments—would resonate widely. Many in the UK acknowledge the economic upsides of migration and the mutual benefits of integration, advocating for its improved functionality. In matters of immigration, “fixing the foundations” should focus on precisely this integration and pragmatic promises.
