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Now, onto the topic at hand. The author, a contributing editor at FT, brings an insightful perspective on the dynamic currents within Europe’s right-leaning political landscape, often branded as either “hard” or “far” right. Interestingly, three distinct streams are emerging within these groups. Some drift towards conservative ideals, drawing in working and lower-middle-class supporters, while others lean more radical, showcasing authoritarian overtones. Despite these evolving paths, they’re often generalized under one umbrella in media and political discussions as “new right” due to their diverse differences.
What ties them together is a shared stance against an ever-empowering EU, which they feel infringes on national sovereignty. Though they’ve stepped back from advocating for an EU exit, they fiercely demand complete government autonomy.
Another common ground is their staunch opposition to mass immigration—a stance resonating widely across Europe. Tougher immigration laws have been implemented in countries like Sweden and Finland, where new-right parties have influenced or partnered with center-right administrations.
However, the application of these policies varies across nations. Taking Italy, since 2022, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, a key figure of the new right, has collaborated with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen at times. Meloni also aligns with NATO and supports Ukraine’s defense efforts against Russia, a position Sweden Democrats share.
In contrast, France’s Marine Le Pen from the Rassemblement National had previously shown pro-Russian sentiments, accepting a loan from a Russian-controlled bank—now settled. Yet, in a recent turn, she criticized President Vladimir Putin in a parliamentary speech, acknowledging the war he instigated as a severe geopolitical crisis, hailing Ukraine’s resistance. This shift portrays a refined strategy as the RN gains popularity, with Le Pen positioned potentially as the frontrunner for the 2027 French presidential race, barring legal hurdles.
Russia remains a pivotal element for many new right factions. Some, like Hungary under Viktor Orbán’s influence, maintain closer ties with Russia over the U.S.-dominated West. While prevalent in former communist Central Europe, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) stands out as Germany’s primary new-right party, sharing similar Russia-friendly views. Inside Germany, the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance mixes leftist economics with strong anti-immigration rhetoric, arguing that such policies disadvantage the German working class in securing essential services.
Within this evolving landscape, Italy, France, and Sweden’s new-right parties remain firmly in the democratic and Western alliance camp. Meanwhile, a larger segment, albeit less successful, in Central Europe, appears more vocally anti-EU, vehemently against immigration, and deeply rooted in Christian and traditional values.
Some entities straddle both spheres, like Hungary’s Fidesz, Spain’s Vox, Portugal’s Chega, and notably, the AfD. In Thuringia, AfD’s Björn Höcke flirts with controversial themes, at times echoing banned Nazi slogans. Meanwhile, party leaders like Tino Chrupalla and Alice Weidel, seen as moderates, seek unity and cohesion within the party, despite Chrupalla’s known pro-Russian leanings.
Labeling these groups uniformly as “far” or “hard” right is contentious—while fitting for provocative figures like Höcke, it obscures understanding genuine anti-establishment sentiments in others who uphold democratic principles. The fear is they might mask moderation while harboring authoritarian ambitions. The influence of Donald Trump, who views many such parties as allies, alongside their governance ability, will inevitably shape their future. But for now, their stance tends to be more anti-totalitarian than otherwise.
